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Preface
The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities is an independent
study group that the American Institute of Certified Public Ac
countants established in October 1974 to examine the numerous
problems and controversies confronting CPAs in their role as inde
pendent auditors. The commission is issuing this statement to ex
plain to interested parties the scope and organization of its study.
This statement outlines through a series of questions the issues
that the commission plans to consider. The commission believes that
this information should be widely and conveniently available be
cause the conclusions and recommendations that will emerge will
have significant implications for both independent auditors and
those who use the work of independent auditors.
The commission plans to hold public hearings, the scheduling
of which will be preceded by a formal call for position papers in a
notice of public hearing that will be distributed with a discussion
of the issues to be considered. In the meantime, however, individu
als and organizations are invited to consider the issues as outlined
in this statement and to submit information relevant to the com
mission’s consideration of those issues. The commission would wel
come position papers, research results, or other forms of relevant
information.
Correspondence on matters discussed in this statement or on
other aspects of the commission’s work should be sent to
Douglas R. Carmichael
The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
M a n u e l F. C o h e n , Chairman
September 1975
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General Background and
Organization of the Study
Introduction

The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities will study the
role of independent auditors in society to identify auditors’ responsi
bilities in relation to the needs and reasonable expectations of users
of financial statements and to recommend actions that the profes
sion should take to assure that independent auditors discharge those
responsibilities adequately.
The commission is similar to two other independent study
groups sponsored by the AICPA, but its work should be distin
guished from the work of those two groups. A seven-man group was
appointed in 1971 to study the process of establishing accounting
principles and to make recommendations for improving that proc
ess. The report of that group (Study Group on the Establishment of
Accounting Principles), which was published in 1972, resulted in
the formation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. A
group to study the objectives of financial statements (Study Group
on the Objectives of Financial Statements), also appointed in 1971,
published its report on those objectives in 1973. Both groups were
concerned with accounting principles and financial reporting objec
tives, matters that relate to the determination of the reporting and
disclosure requirements for financial statements, whereas the com
mission is concerned with matters that relate to the role and respon
sibilities of independent auditors in examining and reporting on
financial statements and other information.
Although accounting and auditing are closely related, inter
dependent disciplines, their objectives differ. Accounting is con
cerned with measuring and reporting the effects of the economic ac
tivity of individual enterprises. Auditing, on the other hand, involves
an independent examination to determine the propriety of account
ing measurements and communications. The distinction between
accounting and auditing, however, cannot always be clearly drawn
because the auditor must consider the appropriateness of accounting
measurements and presentations.
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Organization of the Commission

The members of the commission were chosen to provide con
tributions from a wide variety of backgrounds and experience. A
majority of the members are not professional auditors. The chairman
of the commission, Manuel F. Cohen, is a securities lawyer and a
former chairman of the United States Securities and Exchange Com
mission. Walter S. Holmes, Jr., a nonpracticing CPA, is chairman
of the board and chief executive officer of a large finance-based di
versified company. William C. Norby, a chartered financial analyst
and senior vice president of a Chicago-based firm of professional in
vestment advisors, is a former president of the Financial Analysts
Federation. Lee J. Seidler, also a nonpracticing CPA, is a professor
of accounting and a business analyst and consultant. Three mem
bers, forming a minority in the commission, are professional audi
tors. LeRoy Layton, who recently retired as the managing partner of
an international CPA firm, is a former president of the American In
stitute of CPAs and a former chairman of the Accounting Principles
Board. Kenneth W. Stringer is the senior technical partner in an
international CPA firm. John J. van Benten is the managing part
ner of a midwestern regional CPA firm.
The staff of the commission is under the direction of Douglas
R. Carmichael, director of the Institute's auditing standards divi
sion. The staff includes Paul Rosenfield, director of the Institute’s
technical research division, and Thomas W. McRae and Brian Zell,
also of the Institute’s technical research division. Henry R. Jaenicke,
a professor of business administration and chairman of the depart
ment at Franklin and Marshall College, is the principal research
consultant for the commission. In addition, the commission has en
gaged outside consultants from the academic community and from
the accounting and legal professions to conduct special research
projects. They include two accounting professors, Lewis Davidson
(University of North Carolina) and John Grant Rhode (University
of California at Berkeley) and a partner in a major CPA firm, Rob
ert K. Mautz, who joined that firm after a distinguished career as
an academician.

Scope and Organization of Study

The commission plans to consider how well independent audi
tors are meeting their present responsibilities, whether their respon
sibilities should be changed, and how the nature and limitations of
those responsibilities can best be communicated to users of the audi
tors’ work.
4

The commission has decided to take a comprehensive view of
the problem with which it was presented. To facilitate analysis, the
total problem has been divided into “Phases” and “Issues.” Many
of the different issues dealt with clearly are closely interrelated; how
ever, the initial work of the commission has indicated that the outline
presented here provides a useful and workable framework for the
project. The final report or reports of the commission may not fol
low this format precisely, if subsequent research, consideration, or
other developments suggest a more effective classification.
The members of the commission recognize the ambitious scope
of the project presented here. As the work of the commission pro
gresses, constraints on time and resources may suggest elimination
of some of the issues. The commission may conclude on some issues
that the answers can be provided better by other bodies. Neverthe
less, the commission believes that the total problem should be ini
tially considered on as broad a basis as possible. The scope of the
project will be narrowed, if necessary, only after the commission
has considered all of the issues identified.
The term “issues” has been applied to the sixteen major seg
ments of the project. However, the use of that word does not neces
sarily imply that a controversy exists in each area identified as an
issue.
The issues have been delineated in this statement largely in
terms of a series of questions. Many of the questions emphasize pos
sible changes in existing practices, relationships, structures, and so
forth. That approach should not be construed to imply that the
members of the commission have prejudged the need or desirability
of change in any of the areas under consideration. To the contrary,
the first stage in the commission’s analysis is an examination and
evaluation of current conditions and practices. That initial step
should therefore be considered as an implicit starting point in the
consideration of all the issues.
The first two issues, (1) the role of the independent auditor
and (2) the gap between performance and expectations, are funda
mental and relate to the overall objectives of the study. Many of the
factors outlined under those two issues will pervade the study, and
their resolution will provide a general frame of reference.
The resolution of many issues in the project will inevitably
depend on some fundamental value judgments about the role of the
auditor and the needs and expectations of users of the work of inde
pendent auditors. Also, changes in auditors’ responsibilities will un
doubtedly involve some changes in the costs and benefits of the audit
function. Although precise measurements of costs and benefits are
unattainable, the commission will consider the means of measuring
5

and balancing the costs and benefits of changes in the audit function
in its study of each issue.
The commission divided the issues into the following three
phases: phase I includes issues that relate primarily to a clarification
and amplification of the independent auditor’s present responsibili
ties; phase II includes issues that are involved with the extension of
the auditor’s role to activities and responsibilities that have not tra
ditionally been considered to be encompassed in his role; phase III
includes those issues that relate primarily to the institutional frame
work of the audit function and possible changes in that framework.
Thus, the issues identified in this statement are presented and
outlined under the following headings:
1. General Issues (2 issues).
2. Phase I: The Auditor’s Present Responsibilities (6 issues).
3. Phase II: Extension of the Auditor’s Role (2 issues).
4. Phase III: The Institutional Framework of the Audit Func
tion (6 issues).

Progress to Date

The full commission has been meeting for two to three days
each month since November 1974. Meetings are generally held in
New York. The commission has met twice in Washington, D.C., in
order to develop and maintain a close liaison with government regu
latory agencies concerned with auditing.
The commission has invited and met with a number of con
cerned, well-informed individuals who have given the members the
benefit of their views of the study and the manner in which it should
be conducted. Those individuals were selected from virtually all
groups in the United States having a significant interest in the
auditing function. The commission also met with similarly situated
members of the Canadian financial community in Toronto, under
the auspices of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and
was given the benefit of their views.
Much of the commission’s time to date has been spent on the
development, refinement, and initial consideration of this statement.
Development of background information, surveys of existing litera
ture, and other research work have been completed on the topics
in Phase I, and the staff and members of the commission are in the
process of developing preliminary positions on several of the issues.
A series of research projects has been commissioned from a number
of outside researchers, and several noted individuals have been in
vited to submit papers on specific topics.
6

Public Hearings

The commission plans to conduct one or more public hearings
in the spring of 1976. All individuals and groups interested in or
concerned with the work of independent auditors will be afforded
an opportunity to present their views to the commission. Before a
public hearing is scheduled, the commission will distribute a notice
of hearing with a call for position papers and a discussion document
on the issues to be considered. That document, which the commis
sion plans to distribute in the fall of 1975, will contain a discussion
of many of the questions outlined in this statement and tentative
conclusions on some of those questions.
In scheduling the public hearings, the commission plans to af
ford those desiring to submit position papers sufficient time for
preparation after the notice of hearing and the discussion document
have been distributed. However, this statement provides a basis
for an earlier consideration of the issues, and the commission encour
ages those who are interested in its work to consider this document
carefully. The commission would welcome the submission of posi
tion papers, research results, or other forms of information relevant
to its study before the formal call for position papers.
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General Issues
The two general issues outlined in this section are funda
mental to the study, and the relevant aspects of each will be con
sidered throughout the study.
G-1. The Role of the Independent Auditor
This issue concerns the development of a conceptual foundation for
defining the role of the independent auditor in society as a necessary
basis for delineating his responsibilities.
The commission will consider the role of the independent
auditor in the American economy and, as a framework for its con
siderations of other issues in the study, will develop a statement of
the functions that independent auditors should perform. Aspects of
that statement will include specifications of the users of auditors’
work, the beneficiaries of the audit function, and the appropriate
relationship between information and the audit function.
Before it is completed, the initial statement on this fundamental
issue will be tested against conclusions on the other issues.
A. What economic and social purposes does auditing serve?
1. What segments of society need audits? For what purposes?
2. In what ways does the independent auditor affect the credi
bility, quality, quantity, or other characteristics of the infor
mation with which he becomes associated in a public report?
3. In what ways does auditing affect the process of resource
allocation in the economy?
B. What is or should be the relationship between the types of
information reported on and the auditor’s role? Should the role
be defined in terms of the specific types of information reported
on or more broadly? (The auditor’s role in the financial re
porting process has been largely confined to an expression of
an opinion on quantitative information—for the most part, an
nual financial statements.)
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C. W hat factors in the economic and social environment help to
define and limit the role of the auditor?
1. To what extent are the boundaries fixed by the apparent
competence of auditors?
2. What are the sources (legal, moral, social) of the auditor’s
authority and responsibilities?
a. What events, conditions, or relationships trigger those
responsibilities?
b. To whom do those responsibilities run?
3. What is the impact of the close relationship between ac
counting and auditing?
D. To what extent can the economic and social purposes of audit
ing be expressed in terms of measurable benefits that can be
offset against related measurable costs? To whom should the
costs and benefits of auditing run?
G-2. Gap Between Performance and Expectations
This issue concerns the apparent gap between the performance of
independent auditors and the needs and expectations of users of the
work of independent auditors.
The needs and expectations of those who use and rely on audi
tors’ work affect virtually all the major issues. Recommendations
on the responsibilities of independent auditors must be based on a
reasonable evaluation of differences between the attained level of
performance of independent auditors and the level of performance
expected by users of their work. A gap between performance and
expectations may be caused in part by substandard performance
under present responsibilities, in part by users’ reasonable expecta
tions that auditors accept additional responsibilities, and in part by
users’ unreasonable expectations.
A. Can the evident gap between performance and expectations be
attributed in part to substandard performance under present
responsibilities?
1. Does the available evidence indicate that substandard per
formance is a serious problem?
2. What are the major factors contributing to substandard
performance?
a. The quality of professional training?
b. The quality of professional standards?
c. The enforcement of professional standards?
d. Other factors?
10

3. W hat steps can the profession take to more effectively curb
substandard performance?
B. Can the gap be attributed in part to identifiable factors that in
fluence auditors not to accept additional responsibilities that
they might reasonably assume?
1. Does the available evidence indicate that there are serious
constraints on the expansion of auditors’ responsibilities?
2. What are the major factors contributing to such constraints?
a. The nature of auditing and accounting standards?
b. The methods of establishing those standards?
c. The legal environment?
d. Conflicting responsibilities?
e. The training and behavioral characteristics of auditors?
3. What steps could be taken to reduce the negative effect of
those constraints or factors?
C. Can the performance gap be attributed in part to users’ mis
understandings with respect to
1. The meaning of auditors’ reports?
2. The inherent limitations of historical information presented
in financial statements?
3. The limitations of financial statements attributable to the
necessity of measurement conventions?
4. The limitations inherent in the economic environment, such
as the impact of uncertainties on financial statements?
5. The limitations of auditing methods with respect to reli
ance on
a. Testing rather than complete examination?
b. Persuasive rather than conclusive evidence?
c. Judgmental factors and past experience?
6. The limitations placed on the auditor’s authority, concern,
and work by current conventions, such as
a. The auditor’s concern with the information presented
rather than the soundness of investing in a company?
b. The limitations of historical information as a basis for
users’ projections and decision-making and other pur
poses?
c. Management control over much of the information on
which the auditor must rely?
d. The nature, extent, and effect of the auditor’s obligation
to maintain a confidential relationship with his client?
D. What steps can be taken to narrow the evident gap?
11

Phase Is The Auditor’s
Present Responsibilities
Phase I of the study is concerned with the responsibilities that an
independent auditor should assume in an audit of a company’s an
nual financial statements: responsibilities that laws, regulations, and
the profession’s self-regulatory process impose on the auditor and
responsibilities that users of audited financial statements need and
reasonably expect the auditor to fulfill. The following issues are of
primary concern in this phase of the study.
Forming an opinion on financial presentations
Clarifying responsibility for the detection of fraud
Reporting on uncertainties
Detecting and disclosing adverse management behavior
Improving communication in the auditor’s standard report
Improving auditing methods and techniques
The commission hopes to make useful recommendations on
these issues. Because questions that relate to the independent audi
tor’s association with annual financial statements are broader than
the specific issues to be considered in this phase of the study, aspects
of other interrelated issues will also be considered.
I-1. Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations
This issue concerns the auditor's responsibility in judging presenta
tions in financial statements and the role of “generally accepted ac
counting principles” (GAAP) in that judgment process.
The auditor’s opinion that financial statements “present fairly
. . . in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles”
expresses his judgment about those statements. Questions have been
raised about the nature of both the judgments made and the respon
sibilities assumed.
13

A. What elements of judgment are or should be involved in the

auditor’s formulation of an opinion on financial statements?
1. What judgments about the presentation in a company’s
financial statements does or should an auditor make?
2. To what extent does or should GAAP require explicitly or
implicitly specific elements of judgment?
3. To what extent and in what ways are the judgments re
quired of the auditor different from those required of
management?
4. Is there a set of criteria outside of GAAP that can or should
be applied by the auditor? For example, to what extent can
or should the objectives of financial statements provide cri
teria that would guide or limit the auditor’s exercise of
personal judgment?
B. In what ways does the auditor’s conception of the breadth and
specificity of GAAP help to determine the nature of the audi
tor’s judgment?
1. Should GAAP be broadly construed to include all elements
of the decision process necessary to determine appropriate
application in particular circumstances?
2. Is a more detailed specification of GAAP necessary or de
sirable?
3. Should distinctions be made in the auditor’s responsibility
depending on the state of development of accounting prin
ciples? For example, should the auditor have more respon
sibility when the circumstances have not been specified for
the appropriate application of accounting principles?
C. To what extent and in what ways should the auditor’s responsi
bility for the selection of accounting principles be modified or
clarified? What would be the effects of requiring auditors to
become more involved in the original selection and application
of accounting principles as opposed to appraising management’s
selection and application? What would be the effect on
1. The auditor’s independence?
2. Management’s sense of responsibility for the statements?
3. The auditor’s sense of personal responsibility?

I-2. Clarifying the Responsibility for Detection of Fraud

This issue concerns the responsibility for the detection of fraud that
an independent auditor should assume in an examination of finan
cial statements.
14

Both auditors and users of financial statements have a general
impression that auditors have certain responsibilities for the detec
tion of fraud, but the extent of those responsibilities is unclear.
Developing an acceptable definition of fraud is an essential first
step in considering the auditor’s responsibility with respect to detec
tion of fraud. In the context of this discussion, “fraud” is tentatively
defined as intentional misrepresentation of facts undertaken to mis
lead auditors or users of financial statements, the misappropriation
or misuse of assets, sometimes referred to as defalcations, and other
similar irregularities. The tentative definition is more restrictive
than the legal definition of fraud.
A. To what extent can or should the independent auditor’s un
qualified opinion be interpreted as representing that the finan
cial statements are not materially distorted by undetected fraud?
1. Can or should the representation be construed as an abso
lute guarantee or as only an expression of a degree of ra
tional belief as to a level of probability of the absence of
undetected fraud?
2. In what ways does or should the auditor’s representation
differ for
a. Different types of fraud? For example, should new or
unique types of fraud be excluded?
b. Very material frauds with pervasive effects on the
financial statements as contrasted with lesser frauds with
isolatable effects?
3. What other considerations are appropriate to the determi
nation of the extent to which users are or should be entitled
to rely on the representation as a protection against the risk
of unexpected losses from undetected fraud?
B. What factors are relevant in considering possible approaches for
specifying, in a manner that is consistent with the needs and
reasonable expectations of users, the auditor’s responsibility for
the detection of fraud and for amplifying and interpreting pro
fessional standards to provide guidance to individual auditors?
What are the possibilities, problems, and implications of spe
cifying the auditor’s responsibility on the basis of
1. A classification of frauds according to the extent to which
an ordinary examination in accordance with professional
standards should detect them?
a. Specifying, as a part of its professional standards, objec
tive criteria identifying those types of frauds that an
ordinary examination should detect, based on the char15

acteristics of the types of fraud identified? (Some charac
teristics that have been suggested as possible criteria are
(1) materiality, (2) relationship to internal control,
(3) influence on the financial statements, (4) extent
of concealment, and (5) level of management involved.)
b. A classification of types of frauds in accordance with
their likelihood of detection by relating their character
istics to the availability of audit evidence?
2. A specification, as a part of professional standards, of a gen
eral standard of care that the auditor should exercise in an
ordinary examination that could serve as a criterion for
judging responsibility for detecting fraud? What should such
a standard specify with respect to
a. The assumptions that the auditor should make in ap
proaching the examination, such as his attitude about
the integrity of company management and personnel?
b. The circumstances and conditions that should arouse his
suspicions (raise a “red flag”) ?
c. The assumptions that, in the absence of suspicious cir
cumstances, the auditor should make about the possi
bility of collusion, unrecorded transactions, or forgery?
d. The level of attention that, from a cost-benefit view
point, the auditor should give to sources of possible mis
statements in the financial statements, including not
only fraud but also other possible sources such as (1)
clerical errors, (2) inappropriate selection of accounting
principles, (3) inadequate disclosure, and (4) failure to
reasonably estimate the outcome of future events?

I-3. Reporting on Uncertainties

This issue concerns the auditor’s role in evaluating the effects on
financial statements—including the adequacy of disclosure—of un
certainties concerning the outcome of future events.
The preparation of financial statements requires many estimates
of the outcome of future events. What is the auditor’s responsibility
for the adequacy of disclosures with respect to uncertainties affecting
financial information? Can auditors do more to enable users of their
reports to assess the potential effect of uncertainties? Questions have
also been raised concerning the auditor’s responsibility with respect
to unusual uncertainties (for example, significant pending litigation,
collection of a material receivable from a major customer in finan
cial difficulty, or the future success of a new major product) the
probable effects of which are not reasonably determinable at the
16

time the financial statements are released and, in management’s
judgment, are not susceptible to reasonable estimation.
A. What is or should be the auditor’s responsibility to predict the
outcome, or to evaluate management’s predictions of the out
come, of future events whose effects are estimated and reflected
in the financial statements?
1. What is the responsibility of the auditor with respect to un
certainties that effect the measurement or valuation of spe
cific items in financial statements?
2. How is the auditor’s responsibility affected by the source
(for example, management, outside experts, historical guide
lines) of the prediction that the auditor is evaluating?
3. How should the auditor’s responsibility for estimates involv
ing matters generally considered to be within his traditional
area of expertise differ from his responsibility for estimates
involving matters generally considered to be outside of his
traditional area of expertise?
4. How can present audit techniques for assessing uncertain
ties be evaluated? What role do or should probabilities play?
B. What is or should be the auditor’s responsibility for assessing
the outcome of future events whose effects are not susceptible to
reasonable estimation? To what extent and in what ways should
the auditor
1. Assess the adequacy of disclosure of the potential effect of
the unresolved events on the financial statements?
2. Call attention in his report to the potential effect of the un
certainty on the financial statements?
3. Disclose in his report his prediction of the outcome of future
events by giving a quantitative or qualitative indication of
the likelihood of the future events?
4. Be required to qualify his opinion in light of unusual un
certainties? What are the implications of such requirements
for an unqualified opinion?
5. Withhold an opinion on the financial statements if his own
prediction of the outcome of the future event indicates a
strong likelihood of unfavorable resolution? How likely
should the unfavorable outcome be?
6. Be responsible for assessing unusual uncertainties if they
concern the ability of the company to continue operations?
C. What factors should be considered in defining and limiting the
auditor’s responsibility for reporting on uncertainties? For ex
17

ample, to what extent and in what ways should the considera
tions recognize the capability of the auditor in predicting the
outcome of future events as contrasted with the capability of
users?
D. Would fundamental changes in the methods of presenting finan
cial information in financial statements or disclosing uncertain
ties in financial statements be a more appropriate means of
communicating the potential effect of uncertainties to users of
financial statements? (For example, the Report of the Study
Group on the Objectives of Financal Statements, commonly
called the Trueblood Report, recommends a number of changes
in financial statements that would improve the disclosure of
uncertainties. That study group recommended distinguishing
information that is primarily factual from information that is
primarily interpretive, disclosing basic assumptions underlying
matters subject to prediction or estimation, and recognizing
varying degrees of uncertainty by segregating and reporting
separately, and in greater detail, information on the eventual
realization of assets and satisfaction of liabilities.) Those
changes would require a change in existing generally accepted
accounting principles. What effect would those changes, if
adopted, have on the auditor’s responsibility?

I-4. Detecting and Disclosing Adverse Management
Behavior

This issue concerns the responsibility of the auditor for detecting
adverse management behavior and for disclosing known adverse
behavior to interested parties.
Questions have been raised concerning the auditor’s responsi
bility to detect and report on management’s failure to comply with
laws and regulations or other management actions that are disap
proved by society for moral, public policy, or other reasons. Different
considerations may a pply to questions concerning the obligation to
detect and those concerning the obligation to disclose. A funda
mental question is, Does the auditor’s education, training, and expe
rience equip him to deal reasonably in the often-involved complexi
ties of legal and ethical conduct? The other questions in this section
cannot be answered without reference to this fundamental question.
A. To what extent should the auditor in an ordinary examination
be expected to detect adverse management behavior that does
not have a material effect on the financial statements?
18

B. What types of management actions should an auditor be ex
pected to report? Should the actions include those involving
1. Conflicts of interest?
2. Damage to the environment?
3. Political contributions?
4. Improper or questionable insider transactions?
5. Improper or questionable transactions with related parties?
6. Other violations of laws and regulations, for example
a. Bribery of public officials?
b. Laws prohibiting immoral conduct?
C. To whom should the auditor be expected to report adverse
management behavior that comes to his attention?
1. Should the auditor be expected to report the matter
a. To a level of management above that directly involved
with the behavior?
b. To the board of directors?
c. To the shareholders?
d. To the appropriate government regulatory agency? (For
example, should knowledge of violation of rules involv
ing insider transactions be reported to the Securities and
Exchange Commission?)
e. To a particular interested party? (For example, should
violations of a labor contract be reported to union
leaders?)
2. If the board of directors refuses to take action on a matter
reported to it and the auditor resigns, should the auditor re
port the matter to the shareholders or to the general public?
3. Should the auditor require that the matter be disclosed in
the financial statements?
4. Should the auditor be required to disclose the matter in his
report?
D. What considerations should affect the auditor’s decision whether
or not to report the matter?
1. Should the prevailing moral climate in the industry or com
munity affect reporting? (For example, if all businesses in a
particular industry are expected to make payments to pub
lic officials as a condition of doing business, does that indi
cate that the auditor should accept the payments as costs of
doing business?)
2. Should the relationship of the adverse behavior to the opera
tions of the business affect reporting? (For example, is mis
19

use of company property different from bribery of public
officials or adultery?)
3. If the matter has been rectified by discharging the person in
question or other action deemed appropriate by the board
of directors or top management, or by modifying the condi
tions that permitted the behavior, should the matter be
reported?

I-5. Improving Communication in the Auditor s Standard
Report

This issue concerns the role of the auditor's report in communicat
ing with users of financial information and possibilities for improv
ing communication.
Some observers have suggested that the expectations of users of
audit reports may exceed the performance of auditors, in part, be
cause the auditor’s standard report on financial statements fails to
communicate adequately the degree of responsibility that the audi
tor intends to assume.
A. Is the auditor’s report an appropriate vehicle for improving the
understanding of the audit function?
1. Is the wording of the report more or less important than the
general understanding in the financial community of the
function performed by auditors when they are associated
with financial information?
2. To what extent do users of audited financial information
rely on the report for an understanding of the responsibility
that the auditor assumes? To what extent do they base their
understanding on other considerations?
B. What are the implications of the association of the auditor with
financial information without regard to the wording of the re
port? Do those implications suggest that the auditor should not
be associated in some circumstances no matter how clear are his
report and the financial statements?
C. What changes in the wording of the report are necessary or de
sirable to improve communications? Should the report
1. Avoid technical terms and use commonly understood words
to explain the auditor’s responsibility? (This would prob
ably result in a much more lengthy report.)
2. Explain more fully the nature of the auditor’s examination,
including a fuller explanation of the limitations of an audit?
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3. Include an explanation of the division of responsibility
for financial statements between the independent auditor
and the management of the company?
4. Include an explanation of the limitations of accounting in
formation, financial statements, and generally accepted ac
counting principles?
5. Use varied wording rather than one standard form?
D. What other methods could independent auditors use to im
prove the public’s understanding of the audit function?

I-6. Improving Auditing Methods and Techniques

This issue pertains to the possibilities for improving the effectiveness
of auditing methods and techniques.
The independent auditor’s ability to obtain sufficient evidential
matter to support his opinion on financial statements is affected by
the nature and availability of audit evidence and the effectiveness of
the methods the auditor uses to obtain it. The objectives in con
sidering this issue are to determine what improvements, if any,
should be made in the ways that auditors gather evidence, in what
ways the availability of reliable evidence to the auditor can be in
creased, and what should be the relationship of the independent
auditor to others involved with developing or interpreting financial
information.
A. Have failures by independent auditors to detect material mis
statements in financial statements indicated a pattern of major
weaknesses in auditing methods? Do failures suggest
1. Inadequate knowledge of the company or industry?
2. Poor audit planning?
3. Proper planning but poor execution?
4. Inadequate supervision on audit engagements and, if so, at
what level?
5. The need for improvements in procedures in particular
areas of the audit (for example, procedures for payables) ?
B. Do independent auditors need increased authority to obtain
more reliable evidence?
1. Should actions be taken to increase the auditor’s access to
information that management may be concealing? For ex
ample, should penalties be imposed for lying to auditors?
2. Do auditors have ready access to all information within a
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client’s organization? For example, are internal budgets
available to auditors?
3. Do auditors need increased authority to gain access to in
formation from parties outside the audited entity?
In what ways might the technical guidance on auditing pro
cedures be usefully expanded?
1. To include numerous examples of circumstances that should
cause the auditor to exercise more caution or extend his
procedures?
2. To increase the number of required audit procedures and
the extent of audit work required? (For example, confirma
tion of receivables and observation of inventory taking are
required audit procedures. Should other procedures be simi
larly required?)
3. To communicate on a current basis the methods that are
being used to deceive auditors?
What should be the nature of the relationship between inde
pendent auditors and other professionals who in some cases
might be involved with financial information? (For example,
lawyers, actuaries, and engineers are sometimes involved in the
measurement of amounts or the preparation of disclosures for
financial statements.) Should the auditor ever divide his respon
sibility for an opinion on financial statements with other pro
fessionals?
Are changes needed in the relationship between independent
auditors who report on the consolidated financial statements of
an entity (commonly called “principal auditors”) and the inde
pendent auditors of subsidiaries or divisions?
1. Do principal auditors need increased authority and latitude
in determining what portion of the total entity they must
audit?
2. Is this latitude or authority necessary in all circumstances or
only for some types of entities or entities that engage in cer
tain types of transactions?
What effect would various expansions of the auditor’s respon
sibility have on auditing methods? (For example, if the audi
tor assumed more explicit responsibility for detecting deliberate
distortion of financial statements by management, what would
be the effect on audit procedures and on the general cost and
effectiveness of audits?)

Phase II: Extension of the
Auditor’s Role
Phase II, extension of the auditor’s role, will focus on changes that
have been proposed concerning new types of financial information
with which an auditor might be associated, other activities not in
volving financial information that might be encompassed by the
audit function, and the relationship of nonauditing services to the
audit function. The following issues are of primary concern in this
phase of the study.
New forms of reporting
Evaluating the relationship of nonauditing services to the
audit function
The resolution of the issues in this phase will depend signifi
cantly on the conclusions reached on the issues in the first phase
of the study.

II-1. New Forms of Reporting

This issue concerns the possibility of extending the auditor's role in
reporting on new forms of information and on other activities and
characteristics.
The function of independent auditors has traditionally been
to examine and report on a company’s annual financial statements.
However, suggestions are now being made that independent auditors
extend their function to other forms of financial information, to
nonfinancial information, or to activities or subjects not involving
information, such as the adequacy of internal control systems or
the efficiency of certain operations.
Suggestions have been made that independent auditors expand
their function to include examining and reporting on the following
forms of information:
1. Interim financial statements, which are usually issued quar
terly by publicly traded companies.
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2. Financial information in annual reports other than finan
cial statements, such as historical financial summaries, sales
backlog data, graph presentations, and explanations of
changes in results.
3. Forecasts of operating results or cash flows.
4. Financial information in press releases.
5. Financial statements not required to be audited, released
annually or on an interim basis.
6. Nonfinancial information in an annual report, such as the
president’s letter, or descriptions of the qualifications of
management.
7. Data on a company’s contributions to society and the costs
to society of its operations in an annual report or a separate
release.
Cost-benefit considerations that are particularly important in
considering possible extensions of the auditor’s role include these:
1. The potential consequences of inherent differences in the
reliability of other forms of information as contrasted with
traditional financial statements.
2. The potential effectiveness of audits in increasing the reli
ability of information.
3. The possibility of unwarranted reliance on the information.
4. The costs of having the information audited.
5. The potential delays in distribution.
6. The possible effects on the primary audit function.
7. The cost and benefits of institutional changes that may be
necessary to implement the auditor’s association with par
ticular information.
Three aspects of this issue are outlined separately under the
headings: General Forms of Association, The Auditor-of-Record
Concept, and Reporting on Other Activities and Characteristics.
II-1a. General Forms of Association. The following are possible
forms of association.
1. Audit—a form of association involving full use of available
evidence-gathering methods, including the development of
professional standards for gathering evidence and for the
presentation of the information, and the issuance of a re
port expressing the auditor’s conclusions on the conformity
of the information with the standards.
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2. Consultation —a form of association in which management
or the board of directors would select matters involving
presentation of information on which to seek advice from
the auditor. The auditor would not issue a report or take
other action unless he took exception to the presentation.
3. Review —a form of association involving less than an audit
and more than a consultation. The auditor would select the
matters to be reviewed and the procedures to be used and
a report might be issued.
A. Which of the forms of association identified would be worth
while for each of the types of information identified? What pri
ority should be assigned?
B. Is it possible to establish criteria for the involvement of audi
tors with various types of information?
1. To what extent should association with information depend
on the development of relatively objective measurement
standards?
2. To what extent should limits be placed on the auditor’s
association with information, based on
a. Some scale of the relative amount of uncertainty of such
information?
b. The availability of evidence to support that informa
tion?
3. To what extent should the auditor’s involvement require
the use of the full extent of available evidence-gathering
methods? (For example, a review less extensive than an audit
might be more desirable for quarterly financial statements.)
4. Under what circumstances would association on a basis in
volving consideration of only some aspects of information
be desirable? (For example, a review of a forecast might re
late only to compilation and the accounting principles ap
plied, not to the assumptions.)
C. How important, in terms of increasing credibility, is an ex
plicit report on the information with which the auditor is
associated?
1. In what circumstances would a report be necessary?
2. Can the auditor explain adequately in a report the distinc
tions in the extent of responsibility assumed?
a. Can users be expected to understand limitations on re
sponsibility based on the nature of the information, for
example, the inherent uncertainty of a forecast?
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b. Can users be expected to understand limitations based
on the extent of work performed?
II-1b. The Auditor-of-Record Concept. The Securities and Ex
change Commission has suggested the “auditor-of-record” concept as
a particular form of involvement with many types of information.
The concept describes the role of the independent auditor of an
issuer of financial information whose securities are publicly traded.
An auditor-of-record would have a continuing responsibility to as
sess the client’s accounting decisions on a timely basis and review
all public reports prior to issuance in accordance with a reasonable
set of standards developed by either the public accounting profes
sion or the SEC. Acceptance of an engagement to audit annual state
ments would mean automatic acceptance of the responsibility im
plicit in the concept.
A. Is the auditor-of-record concept a better approach to extending
the auditor’s role than consideration of each type of informa
tion individually?
B. If the auditor-of-record concept were adopted, should it involve
an explicit reporting requirement or does the SEC’s view, re
quiring no reporting unless the auditor takes exception to in
formation, seem better?
C. Should the standards for the presentation of information or the
scope of the auditor’s review be set by the SEC or the public
accounting profession, or should the question of setting stand
ards be flexible?
D. Does the auditor-of-record concept suggest any particular prob
lems from a cost-benefit viewpoint?
II-1c. Reporting on Other Activities and Characteristics. Some
matters relevant to the evaluation of an entity are frequently not
presented in the form of information that can be issued to interested
parties. For the most part, these activities or characteristics relate to
the qualitative aspects of an entity, such as characteristics of its man
agement, its information system, or its operations. To a great ex
tent, no generally accepted standards of objective measurement exist
for those qualities. Reporting on them might, therefore, be confined
to identifying problems or deficiencies and making recommenda
tions for improvement.
A. What nontraditional aspects of an entity should independent
auditors become involved in reporting on? Should auditors re
port on
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1. Characteristics of management, such as competence or in
tegrity?
2. Economy or efficiency of operations?
3. Effectiveness of various programs or activities?
4. Compliance with laws and regulations that do not directly
affect financial statements?
5. Adequacy of a company’s information system for manage
ment decision-making?
6. Adequacy of a company’s internal control system?
B. Who should receive the reports?
1. Only those in a position to have the ability and authority
to initiate the changes recommended (management, board
of directors, or regulatory agency, depending on the circum
stances) ?
2. Parties to whom management or the board of directors
agree to make the report available?
3. Interested parties that request the report from the com
pany, such as investors, potential investors, suppliers, cus
tomers, or employees?
C. Should the various types of reports that would be made avail
able to any interested parties
1. Include only those deficiencies or weaknesses not corrected
prior to issuance?
2. Appear in the company’s annual report?
D. Which types of reports should be optional in the sense that a
company may request them if management or the board of di
rectors desires, and which should become a normal part of an
annual audit?

II-2. Evaluating the Relationship of Nonauditing Services to
the Audit Function

This issue is concerned with the relationship of nonauditing services,
such as management advisory services and tax practice, to the audit
function and the possible need for restriction or expansion of those
services.
Questions have often been raised about the appropriate rela
tionship between the audit function and other services that CPA
firms perform for audit clients. Important considerations are the in
fluence of recent developments on acceptance of past practices and
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the effect on the auditor’s role if services were significantly expanded
or reduced.
A. To what extent does the evidence suggest that failures in audit
performance have resulted from performance of consulting
services for audit clients?
B. Is it feasible to establish relatively objective criteria for identi
fying the types of activities and services that CPA firms should
be permitted to provide audit clients? Is the degree or type of
association with a client’s interests inherent in a particular ser
vice a more important factor than the general relationship be
tween a CPA firm and its client? (For example, would per
forming an advocacy role in tax matters or involvement in de
cision-making in management services seriously affect inde
pendence?)
C. Should any proposed extension of the independent auditor’s
role be limited on the grounds that it conflicts with the basic
audit function?
D. W hat changes might be made in the organization or practice
of CPA firms to reduce a possible problem of a conflict between
nonauditing services and the audit function?
1. Should functions be segregated within CPA firms?
2. Should total fees or components of fees paid to CPA firms
be disclosed?
3. Should steps be taken to increase the knowledge of users of
the audit function concerning nonauditing services?
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Phase III:
The Institutional
Framework of the
Audit Function
Phase III is concerned with the various institutions in society that
govern how independent auditors are educated, licensed, regulated,
and disciplined. The primary focus will be a consideration of
changes in the institutional framework that may be necessary to al
low independent auditors to fulfill their present responsibilities ade
quately or to accept new responsibilities. The following issues are
of primary concern in this phase of the study.
Organizational structure for regulating the profession
Policies and procedures for maintaining the quality of audit
practice
Process of establishing auditing standards
Developing individuals as independent auditors
Relationships between the auditor and parties interested in the
audit function
Legal environment of independent auditors
The conclusions and recommendations formulated in the first two
phases of the study may have to be modified if the necessary or de
sirable changes in the institutional framework cannot be achieved.

III-1. Organizational Structure for Regulating the Profession

This issue is concerned with the effectiveness of the present organi
zational structure of the auditing profession for regulating the prac
tice of auditing and possibilities for improving that structure.
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Questions have been raised concerning possible changes in the
structure of the auditing profession and the relationships between
the organizations and institutions involved in training, licensing,
regulating, and disciplining independent auditors. How should the
auditing profession be organized and how should it relate to other
institutions in society to meet effectively the needs and expectations
of society?
Under the present organizational structure for regulating the
practice of independent auditors, fifty-four separate jurisdictions li
cense and regulate individual CPAs. Virtually all professional organ
izations of CPAs have memberships composed of individuals, and
their regulations relate primarily to their members. Practice, how
ever, is significantly influenced by regional, national, and interna
tional CPA firms.
A. To what extent should changes be made in the process of licen
sing independent auditors? (Licensing in this context includes
other related processes, such as the possibility of accreditation
or registration.)
1. Should practitioners be licensed on some national basis?
(For example, should practitioners who engage in interstate
commerce be licensed on a federal basis rather than a state
basis?)
2. Would national licensing be a substitute for or an addition
to the licensing by state agencies?
3. Should national licensing be for individuals and firms?
B. Should any changes be made in the licensing process to give
recognition to differences in the types of services or functions
performed?
1. Should a distinction be made on the basis of the degree of
public interest in an independent auditor’s work? (For ex
ample, should a distinction be based on whether an audi
tor’s work is involved primarily with companies whose
shares are publicly traded?)
2. Should a distinction be made on the basis of specialization,
such as by industry or by skills such as computer auditing
or taxation?
C. Should changes in licensing include establishment of a body
to regulate those firms whose practice is primarily auditing com
panies with publicly traded securities?
(Regulating auditing practice by firms rather than by individuals
would be a fundamental change in the institutional framework.
30

Considering the possibility of that type of change raises the follow
ing additional questions.)
D. What disciplinary authority and what privileges would a body
charged with regulating firms need to be effective?
1. What privileges would be needed by the body? (For ex
ample, should the body have subpoena power, investigatory
confidentiality, or immunity from civil litigation?
2. What relationship should the body have to existing bodies
concerned with disciplinary matters such as state boards of
accountancy?
3. W hat rights might be provided for appeal from disciplinary
decisions of the body?
E. What role might the federal government have in the operations
of the body? (For example, the role could be supportive, such
as the relationship between the SEC and the FASB; supervis
ory, such as the relationship between the National Association
of Securities Dealers and the SEC; or directly regulatory.)
What federal agency should be involved? An existing agency
such as the SEC or the GAO, or a new agency?
F. If a national body were established to regulate the work of
firms, should that body be a part of the AICPA or should it
be a new, independent body?
(Several matters that relate to the regulation of practice are consid
ered as separate issues, but the following questions on certain aspects
of those issues that relate to the establishment of a national body
to regulate firms are raised in this section.)
G. If a national body were established to regulate firms, should its
functions include:
1. Supervision of quality review programs and public disclo
sure of information bearing on the public’s confidence in
firms?
2. Establishing professional standards?
3. Establishing standards and administering a program for
qualification to practice?
4. Assuring protection to the public against losses from faulty
financial reporting? (For example, a federal government in
surance program might be established.)

III-2. Policies and Procedures for Maintaining the Quality
of Audit Practice

This issue is concerned with the effectiveness of present policies and
procedures for maintaining the quality of audit practice and the de31

sirability of increasing information available to the public concern
ing a firm’s quality review practices and other information that
might bear on public confidence.
The performance of firms of independent auditors depends in
part on the quality control procedures of those firms. The confi
dence of the public in specific firms may be affected by public in
formation on quality control review programs and other relevant
aspects of a firm’s operations.
A. What are the basic elements that assure quality of performance
by individuals and firms? Is there evidence that quality control
programs are effective? To what extent should reliance be
placed on individuals who have been made highly conscious of
their responsibilities versus reliance on formal quality control
programs?
B. To what extent do failures in audit performance indicate weak
nesses in quality control programs?
C. Should an independent review of a firm’s quality controls by
an outside group be voluntary or mandatory?
D. What group should supervise and conduct independent reviews
of quality control programs?
E. Should a firm that has had an independent quality control re
view be permitted (or required) to disclose the results of that
review to various parties?
F. Should firms establish independent public review boards com
posed of knowledgeable individuals not involved in the prac
tice of auditing to review the organizational structure and oper
ating procedures of firms? (For example, a large public ac
counting firm has appointed such a board.)
G. To what extent and in what form should firms of independent
auditors disclose their financial resources, operating results, and
other relevant information?

III-3. Process of Establishing Auditing Standards

This issue is concerned with possible ways of making the present
process for establishing auditing standards more effective or efficient.
The members of the AICPA in 1948 and 1949 adopted ten for
mal standards for the guidance of auditors in the conduct of an
audit. The series of Statements on Auditing Standards issued by the
AICPA’s auditing standards division are interpretations of the stand
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ards and provide more detailed guidance. Statements on Auditing
Standards are issued by the auditing standards executive committee
of the AICPA’s auditing standards division, which is composed of
twenty-one members who serve on a voluntary basis.
Possible ways of changing the process of establishing auditing
standards and the relative advantages and disadvantages of those
changes need to be evaluated.
A. What body should have primary responsibility for establishing
auditing standards? What would be the advantages and dis
advantages of the body being
1. The AICPA (the auditing standards division or a similar
body) ?
2. An autonomous nongovernmental body (such a body might
be a national body that regulates CPA firms) ?
3. A governmental body (such as the SEC or GAO or a new
body) ?
B. What should be the composition and structure of the body
charged with establishing auditing standards?
1. What is the optimum size for the body?
2. Should the chairman, or the chairman and some or all mem
bers serve on a full-time, paid basis?
3. What backgrounds and skills should members of the body
have?
a. How many should be CPAs?
b. How many should be practicing auditors?
c. Should any interest groups other than practicing auditors
be represented?
4. What is the most desirable relationship between the extent
and quality of the staff assistance provided for the activity
and the composition and required commitment of the mem
bers of the body?
C. What methods of operation should the body use to assure
timely and effective pronouncements?
1. Are present procedures for the exposure of a pronounce
ment prior to issuance satisfactory?
2. Should public hearings be held prior to the issuance of
some or all types of pronouncements?
3. Should an advisory committee be appointed to assist in
establishing priorities and to represent additional interest
groups? If so, what should be the size and composition of
an advisory committee?
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4. By what vote of its membership should the body act? Ma
jority? Two-thirds? Other?
5. Is the present procedure for issuing unofficial auditing in
terpretations satisfactory? (Interpretations are now prepared
by the auditing standards division staff and reviewed by
the executive committee.) If not, how should the process
be changed?
D. What type of research is necessary as a prelude to establishing
auditing standards?
1. Who should conduct it?
2. How should it be financed?

HI-4. Developing Individuals as Independent Auditors

This issue is concerned with the effectiveness of the present process
for establishing and administering procedures for recognizing indi
viduals as qualified to practice as independent auditors, including
education, and possibilities for improving that process.
Questions on qualifications for individuals to practice are closely
related to those concerning regulation of practice. In fact, they refer
to complementary approaches to controlling the quality of a pro
fession.
A. Do past failures in audit performance indicate deficiencies in the
professional qualification requirements for auditors?
1. To what extent can the failures be attributed to deficien
cies in
a. Technical knowledge and understanding of accounting
theory, principles, and practices?
b. Technical knowledge and understanding of auditing
theory, standards, and practices?
c. Knowledge and understanding of nontechnical matters?
d. Professional attitude?
2. Is the present division of responsibility for the education of
auditors appropriate? To what extent should auditors be
expected to receive their education in
a. Colleges and universities before entry into the profes
sion?
b. CPA firms at the time the auditor enters the profession?
c. Continuing professional development programs of firms
or professional organizations or through continuing in
dividual efforts?
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3. To what extent can deficiencies in performance be attrib
uted to each of the three areas of education?
4. Are current requirements for professional licensing adequate
and appropriate?
B. W hat changes may be appropriate in the process of educating,
training, and licensing of individual auditors?
1. Should professional schools of accounting be established?
2. Should continuing education after licensing be mandatory?
3. Can the Uniform CPA Examination be changed to test bet
ter the skills and knowledge required of independent audi
tors?
C. What effect would extension of the independent auditor’s role
have on the future manpower needs of the profession and what
steps should be taken to meet those needs?

III-5. Relationships Between the Auditor and Parties
Interested in the Audit Function

This issue is concerned with the relationship of the independent
auditor to investors, creditors, the board of directors and its audit
committee, management, and other interested parties, and the na
ture and extent of the auditor's responsibilities to those various
parties.
The auditor’s work affects many parties and the auditor has
responsibilities, which vary in extent and nature, to a variety of
interests.
A. To what extent are basic changes in the relationship between
the auditor and the management of the audited company nec
essary or desirable?
1. Should changes be considered that would tend to produce
more of an adversary relationship between management and
the auditor?
2. How should potential conflicts between the auditor’s re
sponsibility for public disclosure and his obligation to the
company for confidentiality be resolved?
B. To what extent are changes in the methods of appointing or
compensating auditors desirable?
1. Should formal appointment or replacement be placed more
directly in the hands of stockholders or their representa
tives?
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2. Should companies rotate auditors on some systematic basis,
such as appointing a new auditor every five years?
3. Is it desirable and feasible to establish some new means of
compensating auditors so that fees are not paid directly
by the audited company?
4. Should audit fees be disclosed?
To what extent are modifications desirable in the process by
which a company changes auditors?
1. Should the reasons for a change be communicated to stock
holders and other interested parties beyond current Form
8-K requirements?
2. Would making a change in auditors more difficult be de
sirable?
Should companies be required to establish audit committees?
1. Should any particular form of operations be suggested for
audit committees? For example, should they
a. Have an independent staff?
b. Be required to report at annual meetings?
2. Should regular meetings with audit committees or full
boards of directors be required of auditors?
To what extent are changes in the nature and extent of com
munications between independent auditors and stockholders
or other interested parties necessary or desirable?
1. Should auditors be given the right, or be required, to at
tend annual meetings to answer questions?
2. When should auditors have the right to communicate di
rectly with interested parties, such as stockholders, creditors,
or others?
What should be the methods of implementing proposed
changes in relationships?

III-6. The Legal Environm ent of Independent Auditors
This issue is concerned with the effect of the present process for
litigating claims against auditors and the desirability and possibility
of changes in that process.
The courts are the ultimate forum for the resolution of dis
putes about the adequacy of an auditor’s performance, but they may
not necessarily be the most efficient forum. When expectation levels
of the public exceed those of independent auditors, the courts often
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resolve the conflict. That process can be costly both for those in
volved and for society.
A. To what extent does recent and current litigation indicate that
public expectations exceed the responsibilities that auditors can
reasonably be expected to fulfill?
B. To what extent has the present process of adjudicating charges
against independent auditors produced desirable social conse
quences?
C. Has the present process for adjudicating charges against inde
pendent auditors produced undesirable social consequences?
1. Has the apparent extent of exposure to legal liability
a. Reduced the willingness of independent auditors to ac
cept additional responsibilities in connection with the
audit of annual financial statements or to extend their
functions?
b. Reduced the quantity or quality of personnel entering
or continuing in the profession?
2. Is the possibility that auditors will not accept clients in fi
nancial difficulty or clients engaging in new and untried
ventures a significant problem?
D. Several factors appear to have contributed significantly to the
recent increase in litigation against independent auditors. As a
matter of public policy, should the profession attempt to
change any of the following factors:
1. The contingent fee system for plaintiffs’ attorneys?
2. Federal rules relating to class actions in securities litigation?
3. The burden of proof to demonstrate lack of culpability
placed on defendants by Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933?
4. The applicability of SEC Rule 10b-5 to routine audits not
made for offerings of securities and flexible standards in
finding liability?
5. The broadening scope of common-law liability to third
parties for negligence?
E. To what extent might changes be made to reduce the possibil
ity of litigation not involving substandard performance, with
out unduly restricting the rights of damaged plaintiffs?
1. Should efforts be made to have a limitation placed on the
amount of monetary damages for which a CPA can be held
liable?
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2. Should courts be urged to refer technical questions involv
ing compliance with professional standards to a special ad
visor to the court (a master) ?
3. Should the courts be urged to recognize adherence to pro
fessional standards as an adequate defense for independent
auditors? What consideration should be given to varying the
conclusiveness of this defense for criminal versus civil liti
gation?
If changes were made in the process of determining the legal
liability of independent auditors, would some form of federal
insurance for investors be desirable?
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APPENDIX

Charge to the Commission
on Auditors’
Responsibilities
Issued by the Board of Directors of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
A Study of the Responsibilities of Independent Auditors
In the broadest sense, the function of independent auditors is to en
hance the reliability of information used in financial decisions of a wide
range of individuals and organizations. This role is an important aspect of
the process of efficient allocation of resources in the economy. Therefore, it
is vital to the economy that users of information have confidence in auditors.
Such confidence is dependent on a mutual understanding as to the appro
priate responsibilities of auditors and a belief by users that such responsi
bilities are being fulfilled.
In view of the growing demands by investors, creditors, management,
government, and the general public for auditors to assume a wider scope of
responsibility, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has
concluded that a full-scale study should be made of the future function of
independent auditors.
The main purpose of the study is to develop conclusions and recom
mendations regarding the appropriate responsibilities of independent audi
tors. It should consider whether a gap may exist between what the public
expects or needs and what auditors can and should reasonably expect to
accomplish. If such a gap does exist, it needs to be explored to determine
how the disparity can be resolved.
Some of the specific questions being asked by the public are, What
responsibility should an auditor have for detecting fraud? Should auditors
monitor all financial information released to the public and if so, what
should be the extent of their responsibilities? Should the auditor’s standard
report, particularly the phrase “present fairly,” be changed to express better
the responsibilities of auditors? What mechanisms should be adopted to
strengthen the function of auditors? Is the mechanism for developing audit
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ing standards adequate? What should the profession do to reduce the risks
of misunderstanding about its role?
In considering such questions, the study should recognize that the re
sponsibilities of auditors may be constrained by the nature of the informa
tion presented, the evidence that exists to support that information, the
effectiveness of the methods of acquiring that evidence, and the costs of
collecting and analyzing the information. In developing the feasible respon
sibilities of auditors, responsibilities should not be confused with results.
Recognizing a responsibility does not necessarily imply infallibility in exe
cution.
The study should obtain the views of as many interested and knowledge
able parties as is possible and should assure that the views obtained are
representative of users and providers of independent audits as well as pro
viders of financial information. One or more public hearings should be
held. A public record should be maintained of significant proceedings of
the study and of comments received.
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